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God may well slay me; I may have no hope/ Yet I will argue my case before God,
Job 13:15 (Miles 324)
[To love the Torah more than God is] protection against the madness of a direct
contact with the Sacred that is unmediated by reason,
Emmanuel Levinas [Difficult 144)
The relationship between Judaism and the
classical tradition, between Athens and
Jerusalem, the God of Israel and the God of
the Christians, and Continental and Jewish
thought has been and remains argumenta-
tive. To some, this relationship rests on a
fundamental binary in which Judaism and
classical thought are conceptualized as antip-
odes, mutually exclusive antagonists having
little or nothing in common. As Hannah
Arendt [Origin^ and others have docu-
mented. Hitler and the Third Reich trans-
formed this binary into a vicious twentieth-
century totalitarian movement that led to the
Shoah (Holocaust), The two traditions, oth-
ers hold, share some beliefs and differ on
others, with economic, political, religious
and cultural contexts influencing the degree
to which difference and commonality are
stressed (Levinas, Difficult 275; Handelman,
Slayers 4), I believe the two traditions are a
philosophical pair (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 415-18), They are antinomies: two
coherent and relatively reasonable systems
of thought that sometimes contradict.
My hope is that a juxtaposition of classical
and Jewish understandings of argument and
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argumentation will contribute to the contem-
porary theory and practice of reasoned dis-
course. Ultimately, I aspire to show how a
philosophy and pedagogy of argumentation,
informed by normative Jewish patterns of
reasoning and the Jewish-inflected works of
Emmanuel Levinas and Chaim Perelman,
can help to cultivate a more pluralistic and
civil society in the twenty-first century, one
based on disagreement expressed through
argument rather than on consensus enforced
through rules or secured through schism and
polarization, I do not suggest that Judaic
thought is intrinsically better or is exclusive
in its emphasis on pluralism and civility;
doing so would betray the very impulse at
the heart of this system of thought. Jews can
draw from their tradition doctrines of exclu-
sion and incivility. Witness, for example,
how the setders of the occupied West Bank
depict Palestinians as modern day
"Amaleks" (ancient enemies of the Jews)
with the Hebrew Bible (Rowland and Frank
148), This reasoning deviates significantly
from that of normative Judaism, which I fea-
ture in this study.
For the purposes of contrasting classical
and Jewish perspectives on argumentation, I
will assume that the two can be distinguished
by their respective views on the following
philosophical pairs: ontology and speech.
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the vita contemplativa and vita activa, philoso-
phy and rhetoric, and apodictic logic and
argumentative reasoning. Classical, West-
em, Patristic (Christian), and Enlightenment
thought favors the first term over the second
in these pairs, often allowing the first term to
rule if not obliterate the second (Arendt, Hu-
man; Perelman, "Reply"). I follow Chaim
Perelman's definition of the classical tradi-
tion, with the understanding that there are
major exceptions to his generalizations (as
there are to my efforts to identify fundamen-
tal patterns of Jewish thought):
[T]he tradition I called classical assigns but little im-
portance, as far as achieving science and contempla-
tion goes, either to practice or to the historical and
situated aspects of knowledge.. .. This viewpoint is
held in common by Plato and Aristotle, as well as by
thinkers such as Descartes.. . . The tradition I call
classical includes all those who believe that by means
of self-evidence, intuitions—either rational or empir-
ical—or supernatural revelation, the human being is
capable of acquiring knowledge of immutable and
eternal truths, which are the perfect and imperfect-
ible reflexion of an objective reality. ("Reply" 86)
In drawing upon the Jewish countermodel to
classical thought and on the works of Levi-
nas and Perelman, we may chose to reverse
the terms in the key philosophical pairs by
favoring speech over ontology, the vita activa
over the vita contemplativa, rhetoric over phi-
losophy, and argumentative reasoning over
apodictic logic. Unlike the classical tradition,
this reversal of terms in Jewish thought does
not mean the elimination of or lack of re-
spect for the second term, as philosophical
pairs nest opposites in the same system; phi-
losophy and rhetoric can coexist, apodictic
logic and argumentation can complement
one another.
These philosophical pairs have had signif-
icant consequences for the study and prac-
tice of argument in western culture. Bruce
Kimball's comprehensive history places or-
atory and public argument, which were clus-
tered under the art of rhetoric, at the center
of ancient Greek and Roman education.
FALL 2004
This center was under constant attack by
philosophers who, by the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries, gained control of the newly
emergent universities and stressed "specula-
tive thought" over public action, logic and
mathematics over the more practical disci-
plines. As a result, "rhetoric .. . dropped
from sight or was transformed into a highly
formal" art (Kimball 207).
In the 1660s Peter Ramus removed logic
and reason from the realm of rhetoric, plac-
ing it instead in mathematics and sciences,
thereby effectively demoting and degrading
rhetoric (Ong). Although Ramus's direct re-
sponsibility for the demise of rhetoric is
questionable (Conley 142-43), rhetoric did
not recover fully until the 1950s when Perel-
man and the other "new rhetoricians" sought
to revive nonformal logic and argumentative
reason (Hauser). "The struggle between phi-
losophy and rhetoric in Greece ended in
philosophy's conquest" writes Susan Han-
delman; in contrast "The Rabbis . . . never
suffered this schism . . . " {Slayers 11).
To understand how Jewish thought "never
suffered this schism" I will consider the birth
of argument in the Hebrew Bible, the devel-
opment of argumentative reason in the Tal-
mud (which interprets the Hebrew Bible)
and, finally, two important statements on
Jewish thought and argument, cast in re-
sponse to the Holocaust. Accordingly, I will
begin with three founding illustrations of
Jewish argument with God in ancient Juda-
ism as recorded in the Hebrew Bible. These
arguments, I believe, establish the funda-
mental metaphysical, theological, axiologi-
cal, and epistemological assumptions of He-
braic patterns of thought. Then I will refiect
on the form and function of Talmudic argu-
ment as it struggled to illuminate this Bible in
the Diaspora. In conclusion, I yoke the ideas
of Emmanuel Levinas and Chaim Perelman,
important twentieth-century Jewish thinkers
who provide argumentation theorists with a
Jewish-influenced outlook on argumentative
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reason, one that can complement the more
humane impulses of classical thought.
This survey, of course, will operate at the
surface and must ignore the great complex-
ity of the Jewish and classical traditions. I
will use Robert Alter's new translation of the
Torah and the Jewish Study Bible to consider
the arguments between and involving God,
Abraham, and Moses. I will supplement the
Jewish Study Bible with translations by Miles
and Mitchell for my analysis of argument in
Job. I will follow Miles's lead and treat God
as an advocate who develops character and
argumentative competence over time in the
Hebrew Bible. In addition, unlike the argu-
ments in many Western texts, those in the
Hebrew Bible are often indeterminate, con-
fused, and can yield a host of reasonable but
incompatible interpretations. In the next sec-
tion, I begin with the genesis of argument in
the Jewish tradition and consider as founda-
tional to Jewish thought the arguments made
to God by Abraham, Moses, and Job, and
God's responses.
ARGUING WITH Gk)D
The field of argument has yet to penetrate
the fields of Jewish studies or philosophy,
although one will find some studies that use
our scholarship for purposes of taxonomy
and argument classification. Laytner's Argu-
ing with God: A Jewish Tradition provides a
comprehensive overview of the multiple in-
stances of humans and God involved in ar-
gumentation. However, Laytner does not
draw from our field to conceptualize and
explain the Bible's arguing-with-God pat-
tern. His otherwise superb study collapses
the arguing-with-God notion into the "law-
court pattern" of prayer. This pattern reveals
itself in a four-part structure: God is ad-
dressed as judge, the facts of the case are
presented to God, a request is made to God
on the basis of the facts, and God, if per-
suaded, responds. This pattern, with the key
exception of Job's argument with God, does
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describe an archetypal pattern of argument
between God and humans but, in reducing
argument to prayer and the law-court pat-
tern, Laytner often misses the deeper mean-
ing of argument in the Hebrew Bible.
The God of the Hebrew Bible is, by na-
ture, argumentative. Humans, made in
God's image, also are argumentative and, in
that famous description found in Exodus 32,
are described by God as "thick-necked." Ag-
onistic speech is the beginning of Jewish the-
ology. Genesis I has God, in the words of
Robert Alter's translation, facing "welter and
waste" and then speaking the world and hu-
manity into existence (17). Speaking, or da-
var, is the touchstone notion in the Hebrew
Bible, which Handelman defines as speech
and thought, word and thing [SlayersJi-A). In
this tradition, there is no distinction between
symbol and reality: "for the Hebrew mind,
the essential reality of the table was the word
of God, not any idea of the table as in the
Platonic view" (Handelman, Slayers 32). In
contrast, the classical tradition dissociates the
word from the thing (the map is not the
territory) and privileges what Aristotle
termed "First Being" [ousia). True knowledge
exists in this tradition beyond the symbol,
and Being is grasped through a silent specu-
lation that transcends speech and noise.
There is no Hebrew word for Being because
"[o]ne does not pass beyond the name as an
arbitrary sign towards a non verbal vision of
the thing, but rather ̂ om the thing to the word,
which creates, characterizes, and sustains it.
Hence davar is not simply thing but also ac-
tion, efficacious fact, event, matter, procesf (Han-
delman, Slayers 32). God's arguments be-
come speech acts, creative interventions in
the world of experience. Indeed, as Katz has
demonstrated, the very letters of the Jewish
alphabet may reveal the "source of Jewish
cultural and spiritual isolation, conscious-
ness, and survival" (S. B. Katz 151).
The Hebrew God established speech {da-
var) rather than Being {ousicij as the primary
term. This God is both knowable and often
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inscrutable. Unlike the Greek gods, the God
of the Hebrews "presuppose [s] that God is
good and that creation (and the creation of
people) is good" (Laytner xix), Zeus does not
assume a benevolent attitude toward hu-
mans, nor does he appear to enter time. The
God of the Hebrew Bible appears fallible,
enters into and is constrained by human
time. In Greek myth, humans do not engage
in genuine argument with Zeus, The Ghris-
tian tradition submerges the arguing-with-
God tradition in order to emphasize contri-
tion. Where the Hebrew Bible has Job
declaring "[God] may well slay me; I may
have no hope; Yet I will argue my case
before Him," the Kingjames version bowd-
lerizes the passage with this translation that
eliminates argument: "Though he slay me,
yet will I trust in him: but I will maintain
mine own ways before him" (Miles 324),
Jack Miles believes the Hebrew Bible is
configured diachronically and synchroni-
cally around God's argument with Job, I
agree with Miles, as discussed below, that
Job defeats God in argument, producing a
sequence of action, speech, and silence in
the arrangement of the Hebrew Bible in
which the book of Job is the climax. The
Ghristian Bible reorganizes the books of the
"Old" Testament to herald the coming of
Jesus as Messiah, creating a sequence of ac-
tion, silence, and speech in which the pro-
phetic texts of Joshua, Judges, etc, comprise
the final third in which God acts and speaks
in anticipation of the coming Christ, The
books of the prophets are moved to the end
of the Old Testament in the Ghristian Bible
in order to bridge the Old and New Testa-
ments, In the Hebrew Bible, the prophetic
texts are nested in the middle, and "from the
end of the Book of Job to the end of the
Tanakh [the Hebrew Bible], God never
speaks again" (Miles 329), The books follow-
ing Job depict a silent God, a pattern re-
peated in the Talmud and the works of Levi-
nas and Perelman,
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God's choice to argue with Abraham,
Moses, and Job unveils the essential qualities
of the Hebrew God, and traces of these foun-
dational arguments can be found in subse-
quent Jewish thought. By arguing, God "en-
ters time and is changed by experience.
Were it not so, he could not be surprised;
and he is endlessly and often most unpleas-
antly surprised. God is constant; he is not
immutable" (Miles 12). God is surprised and
changed by the experience of argument, un-
derscoring the risk that God and humans
undertake when they engage in argumenta-
tion. By arguing, rather than simply exercis-
ing raw power, God relinquishes control
over and vests freedom to humans. When
God and humans argue, and also listen, they
risk significant change to self, others, and
world; a wedge of consciousness and free-
dom is placed between arguers; arguers
adapt to each other through argumentum ad
hominem; and action in the world is a conse-
quence of argumentation.
Henry W, Johnstone, in a neglected state-
ment on the philosophical assumptions of
argument, writes that "[t]o argue is inher-
endy to risk failure, just as to play a game is
inherendy to risk defeat. An argument we
are guaranteed to win is no more a real
argument than a game we are guaranteed to
win is a real game" ("Some Reflections" 1),
God places God's moods and conclusions in
play during argument with Abraham,
Moses, and Job, and not only risks but suf-
fers defeat in argument with Job, To God's
credit, argumentation leads God to reduce
the scope of God's claims in argument with
Abraham, change mood and the decision to
act in response to arguments posed by
Moses, and acknowledge defeat in argumen-
tative exchange with Job, By engaging in
argument, God reveals an openmindedness,
an openness I would extend to God's emo-
tional state as well.
Johnstone captures the deepest function
served by argument, which is to confront self
and other with the risk of change. When
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Miles suggests that God "enters time and is
changed by experience," and is "unpleas-
antly surprised," God reveals the marks of
argumentative encounters (12). These en-
counters change God, which is inconceiv-
able to those who believe in an immutable,
omniscient God. The risk entailed in argu-
ment is a function of God's creation, a cre-
ation that does not provide God or humans
with clear choices, sufficient information, or
the clarity necessary to command immacu-
late perception.
The risk involved in argumentation, ac-
cording to Johnstone, is attended by the free-
dom of those who encounter arguments to
resist, ignore, remain neutral, or agree.
"Power here is bilateral in the sense that
whoever undertakes to correct or supple-
ment what another asserts in the name of
knowledge must be willing to be instructed
by that other person" (Johnstone, Philosophy
134). The choice of argument rather than
physical power to adjudicate conflict creates
what Johnstone calls a rhetorical "wedge"
between arguers ("Rhetoric"). This wedge
creates a buffer of consciousness between the
argument and its judgment. For example, if
God did not choose to abide by the condi-
tions of argument, God would issue com-
mands that would pierce consciousness and
produce instant action. Instead, God's argu-
ments with Abraham, Moses, and Job make
claims open to conscious scrutiny and criti-
cism; freedom reigns.
Freedom is denied in formal logic and the
apodictic reasoning Arendt detected in total-
itarian movements (Arendt, Onj^m 468-72;
Perelman, "The Rational"). Abraham Joshua
Heschel eloquently depicts the freedom in
Jewish thought:
The most commanding idea that Judaism dares to
think is that freedom, not necessity, is the source of
all being. The universe was not caused, but created.
Behind mind and matter, order and relations, the
freedom of God obtains. The inevitable is not eter-
nal. All compulsion is a result of choice. A tinge of
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that exemption from necessity is hiding in the folds of
the human spirit. (13)
Ghaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca describe a spiritual wedge in the use
of argument, and put it this way:
One can indeed try to obtain a particular result either
by the use of violence or by speech aimed at securing
the adherence of minds. It is in terms of this alterna-
tive that the opposition between spiritual freedom
and constraint is most clearly seen. The use of argu-
mentation implies that one has renounced resorting
to force alone, that value is attached to gaining the
adherence of one's interlocutor by means of rea-
soned persuasion, and that one is not regarding him
as an object, but appealing to his free judgment.
Recourse to argumentation assumes the establish-
ment of a community of minds, which, while it lasts,
excludes the use of violence. (55)
By resorting to argumentation, God re-
nounces the use of force to gain adherence
and appeals to the free judgment of Abra-
ham, Moses, and Job, and endorses the es-
tablishment of a wedge of spiritual freedom.
In addition, Johnstone maintains that genu-
ine argument takes the form of ad hominem,
which he rescues from the bin of fallacies
[Philosophy 123-37).
Although it may be weak or strong given
the structure, context, arguer and audience
of a particular argument, Johnstone notes
that the ad hominem is not, by nature, a fal-
lacious expression of reason. Indeed, he lo-
cates it at the core of philosophical reasoning
[Philosophy). The ad hominem argument
makes use of the audience's values and prin-
ciples in reaching conclusions. At the center
of the ad hominem argument rest commit-
ments to which the audience is expected to
remain faithful.
I believe the ad hominem is at the core of
Judaic argument, and manifests as argumen-
tum ad Deus (an argument asking God to be
consistent with God's stated values). As I will
illustrate below, Abraham, Moses, and Job
assume that God is just, an assumption that
God shares. This shared commitment to jus-
tice, or Tsedek, constitutes the shared ground
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of argument for God and God's human in-
terlocutors. In contrast to the Greek notion
of justice, which stresses formal equality,
Tsedek involves compassion for the other and
an integration of equity with mercy, truth
and peace, love and justice (Baruk, Hebraic
Civilization; Baruk, Tsedek; Cohn; Perelman,
Idea of Justice). Divine and human justice, in
this vision, are yoked, as the Deuteronomist
at 16:20 repeats the word twice, declaring
'Justice, justice shall you pursue . . . " That
justice is something to be pursued highlights
the role that argument plays in precipitating
action in the Hebrew Bible.
The Hebraic tradition confuses the dis-
tinction, clear in classical thought, between
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa.
Arendt traces the vita contemplativa to bios
theoretikos, the "ideal of contemplation
[theoria)" [Human 14). Arendt observes: "Tra-
ditionally and up to the beginning of the
modem age, the term vita activa never lost its
negative connotation of 'unquiet'..." [Hu-
man 15). Argumentation, expressed on the
plane of action, was at best a prelude to the
authentic birthplace of Truth, the silence of
contemplation and speculation. Judaism re-
verses the emphasis given to the vita contem-
plativa. The human world, "like the world of
God, is one of action," the world of the vita
activa (Roth 52). At the end of the three
argumentative encounters involving God,
Abraham, Moses, and Job, God takes action;
the arguments have consequences.
To summarize, the Hebrew Bible depicts
an argumentative God, one devoted to argu-
ing with humans. This devotion cannot be
conflated simply with a law-court prayer pat-
tern, for these arguments cannot be con-
tained by a preexisting structure or ritualistic
practice. As Laytner demonstrates, some sig-
nificant patterns in the argumentative dis-
course recur but they are surface character-
istics of a much deeper, more profound
theological and metaphysical expression of
God, humans and the relationship between
the two. The Hebrew God is one who ar-
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gues, meaning this God is involved in lived
time, risks change, does not use an asymmet-
rical power relationship to deny humans
consciousness and the freedom to judge
God's arguments, is committed to using jus-
tice consistently as a primary criterion for
argument evaluation, and translates argu-
ment into action.
The argumentative relationship between
God and humans that is displayed in the
Hebrew Bible echoes throughout the Jewish
tradition, affecting both religious and secular
thought. When God and humans engage in
argument, they develop an expression of
reason at the center of normative Judaism.
To understand the importance of this ex-
pression of reason, I consider, in the follow-
ing sections, three foundational arguments
with God.
Abraham and God: Changing the Criterion of
Justice
"[P]erhaps the most dramatic usage" of the
arguing-with-God motif, Laytner writes, "is
found in the story of Abraham's argument
with God over the fate of the people of
Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18:23-32)"
(3). God initially decides to destroy the two
cities because the residents have sinned.
However, God then argues internally and
asks: "Shall I conceal from Abraham what I
am about to do?" (Alter 88). God answers
God's self that Abraham will be a "great and
mighty nation" and he and his sons will
"keep the way of the Lord to do righteous-
ness and justice . . . " (Alter 88). These latter
claims appear to win the day as God shares
with Abraham the proposal to destroy the
two cities and establishes action (Abraham's
and the two cities') and justice as the two
standards for judging both God's decision
and Sodom and Gomorrah. According to
Laytner, by sharing with Abraham the pro-
posal to wipe out the two cities, God "all but
invites Abraham to question His justice . . ."
(5), establishing a bilateral sharing of power
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essential to the existence of genuine argu-
mentation, Abraham accepts the invitation,
and "stepped forward" to contest God's plan
(Alter 89), In so doing. Alter sees an Abra-
ham "who is surprisingly audacious in the
cause of justice, a stance that could scarcely
have been predicted from the obedient and
pious Abraham of the preceding episodes"
(89), This audacious advocate succeeds in
changing God's criterion of justice,
Abraham asks, "Will You really wipe out
the innocent with the guilty?" refusing God's
impulse to apply punishment indiscrimi-
nately (Alter 89), "Far be it from You to do
such a thing, to put to death the innocent
with the guilty, making innocent and guilty
the same. Far be it from You! Will not the
Judge of all the earth do justice?" (Alter 89),
By posing the preface and conclusion as rhe-
torical questions, Abraham helps God de-
velop the standard of justice to be used in
this dispute and then insists that God be true
to God's own principles of justice. The rhe-
torical questions pressure God to perform
the reasoning necessary to reach a just con-
clusion. God then establishes the criterion of
50: "Should I find" God responds, "in So-
dom fifty innocent within the city, I will
forgive the whole place for their sake" (Alter
89), Here, Abraham provokes God to set
forth a numerical criterion, Abraham ques-
tions the number 50, and proposes 45, to
which God accedes, Abraham then proposes
40, then 30, then 20, and God relents. Abra-
ham's final offer of 10, which ends a bargain-
ing session familiar to merchants and cus-
tomers in Middle Eastern casbahs, fleshes
out and then changes the criterion of justice
to be used.
Alter observes that Abraham, who is
"aware that he is walking a dangerous tight
rope in reminding the Judge of all earth of
the necessity to exercise justice, deploys a
whole panoply of the abundant rhetorical
devices of ancient Hebrew for expressing
self-abasement before a powerful figure"
(89-90), This may be true, but God still
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permits Abraham to know God's intentions
and to question the criterion of justice to be
used in assessing the fate of Sodom and
Gomorrah, Abraham's argument pressures
God to change the criterion in two ways in
order to bring it into alignment with Tsedek.
First, the guilty must be separated from the
innocent; in God's initial proposal the two
were undifferentiated. Second, Abraham es-
tablishes a numerical standard of 50 inno-
cents, which in subsequent bargaining is re-
duced five times to 10,
God acts on this new criterion, seeks evi-
dence of the number of innocents in the two
cities, finds only Lot and his family meeting
this standard, spares them, and then destroys
the guilty. Eventually, God turns away from
mass slaying as a vehicle of justice. Yet, the
God-Abraham argumentative exchange is
an important moment; through and with ar-
gument, God shares power with Abraham,
whose character evolves as he develops au-
dacity and courage. This is the prototypical
argument with God, which "affirms the role
of justice as the key relational concept be-
tween God and the world,,," (Laytner 7),
Abraham's argument with God helps God
develop and define justice. Yet Abraham
does not challenge God's plan to destroy
Sodom and Gomorrah if destruction is war-
ranted by their agreed-upon standards. In
contrast, in his argument with God Moses
succeeds in changing God's mood and plans,
Moses and God: Argumentum ad Dem
Moses "lagged in coming down from the
mountain," where he and God were convers-
ing (Alter 493), In Moses's absence, the peo-
ple below lost faith, built a golden calf, and
then "rose up to play" (Alter 495), God can
see this turn of affairs and shares it with
Moses, God is angry, and declares to Moses:
"I see this people and, look, it is a stiff-
necked people. And now leave Me be, that
My wrath may flare against them, and I will
put an end to them and I will make you a
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great nation" (Alter 495). Moses is quick with
argumentum ad Deus, and uses a robust set of
principles to which God subscribes:
Why, O Lord, should your wrath flare against Your
people that You brought out from the land of Egypt
with great power and with a strong hand? Why
should the Egyptians say, 'For evil He brought them
out, to kill them in the mountains, to put an end to
them on the face of the earth'? Turn back from Your
flaring wrath and relent from the evil against Your
people. Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel Your
servants, to whom You swore by Yourself and spoke
to them 'I will multiply your seed like the stars of the
heavens, and all this land that I said, I will give to
your seed, and they will hold it in estate forever.'
(Alter 495-96)
Like Abraham, Moses begins the argument
with a rhetorical question; unlike Abraham,
Moses ends his argument with two direct
claims, suggesting that he was not on a "dan-
gerous tight rope" (Alter 89) and, within the
expected constraints, could avoid self-de-
basement and speak candidly. Moses's argu-
mentum ad Deus calls God to be true to the
principles of justice and reputation, and re-
minds God of a significant loss of face should
the Egyptians witness God's destruction of
the people.
This argumentation is better developed
than that between Abraham and God, re-
flecting the full characteristics of genuine ar-
gument. Here, God's arguments are ad homi-
nem and when God states that God will
"make [Moses] a great nation," God gives
Moses a personal motive to accept God's
proposal. Moses also calls for a change in
mood and quotes God's words, in which he
reminds God of the promises of children and
land, back to God. The response is startling.
God does not bargain as in the argument
with Abraham; rather God "relented from
the evil that He had spoken to do to His
people" (Alter 496). Moses's arguments
change God's plan and mood.
In so doing, Moses helps God develop a
sense of Tsedek that encompasses compassion
and careful thought. God, in this story, forms
an opinion, shares it with Moses, subjects it
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to argumentative scrutiny and, through a bi-
lateral exchange of reasons, changes affect
and policy. The arguments between God
and Moses are, comparatively, more mature
than those between Abraham and God, but
both assume that God favors justice over
power. In the story of Job, this assumption is
challenged, and in the aftermath of the argu-
ment between Job and God, God falls silent.
God and Job: Speaking Justice to Power
The argumentation between Job and God is
quite different than the preceding encoun-
ters. In Job, God violates all of the standards
of genuine argument followed when arguing
with Abraham and Moses. Unlike the resi-
dents of Sodom and Gomorrah and the peo-
ple who built the golden calf, Job had no
brief filed against him for immorality or sin.
At the beginning of the book, the reader
finds Job to be a good man, with wealth,
health, wife, seven sons and three daughters.
Unbeknownst to Job, God and the Adver-
sary (Satan) engage in a conversation about
Job's virtue. God celebrates Job, declaring
him "a thoroughly good man, who fears God
and does nothing wrong" (Job 1:1; Mitchell
12). The Adversary agrees with God, but
attributes Job's just behavior to God's pro-
tection and argues that Job "will curse" God
if he suffers (Job 1:11; Mitchell 12).
God accepts Satan's challenge without
sharing it with Job, and permits Satan to
cause Job great pain. Job loses his wealth and
family. He weeps, shaves his head, but does
not think ill of God. Then Satan ups the ante:
without revealing this decision to Job, God
allows Satan to inflict great physical suffer-
ing. "God damn the day I was born and the
night that pushed me from the womb," Job
laments (Job 3:3; Mitchell 19). God shares
God's intemal arguments with Abraham and
Moses; in contrast,Job knows neither that he
is part of a cosmic bet nor why he is suffer-
ing.
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As a prelude to his confrontation with
God, Job's friends try to comfort him. Their
efforts only add to Job's misery. There is no
textual evidence that Job has done wrong,
and even were he sinful his suffering seems
grotesquely incommensurate to the unre-
vealed evil for which he may be responsible.
Job does not accept or find solace in his
friends' attempts to make sense of his suffer-
ing. Job refuses to accept rational explana-
tions for his plight and, through it all, seeks
justice, not rationalization. It is Job, not God,
who emerges as the character seeking Tsedek.
It is Job who seeks an opportunity to argue
and to know the charges against him: "Oh if
only God would hear me, stated his case
against me, let me read his indictment... I
would justify the least of my actions; I would
stand before him like a prince" (Job 31:35-
37; Mitchell 79). God's response, founded
on the argumentative touchstones developed
by Job's friends, is one of pure power. "Few
speeches in all of literature," Miles writes,
"can more properly be called overpowering
than the Lord's speeches to Job from the
whirlwind (Job 38-41)" (314). These
speeches turn the ad hominem principles of
argumentation on their head, as Job has not
questioned God's power, claimed greater
knowledge than God, or to have been
present at creation. He asks for justice. In
response, God proclaims God's might, but
does not approach the question of justice:
"Where were you when I planned the earth?
Tell me, if you are wise" (Job 38:4; Mitchell
83). And with words of great irony, God asks
Job: "Do you know who took its dimensions,
measuring its length with a cord?" (Job 38:5;
Mitchell 83). God offers no explanation for
Job's anguish, which appears to have no rea-
son or redemptive purpose.
The arguments between Job and God do
not clash: Job's arguments are about justice
while God's reasoning is exclusively about
power. As translated by Miles, Job's re-
sponse to God's power-arguments is an
ironic concession:
Look, I am of no account. What can I tell you?
My hand is on my mouth.
I have already spoken once: I will not harp.
Why go on? I have nothing to add. (Job 40:4-5;
Miles 317)
God insists on rehearsing the power theme,
asking: "Have you an arm like God's? Gan
you thunder with a voice like His?" (Job
40:9; Miles 313). Job's reply, which in the
tradition has been read as a recantation,
should be read as the trump argument in the
exchange.
As noted previously, the tradition re-
presses the notion of arguing with God; both
the Kingjames and Revised Standard ver-
sions seek to establish an attitude of contri-
tion and to highlight the need for the Mes-
siah. As a consequence, almost every
Christian Bible translation of Job's reply is a
variation of the New Revised Standard Ver-
sion's rendering:
"I know that you can do all things,
and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted.
'Who is this that hides counsel without knowledge?'
Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand,
things too wonderful for me, which I did not know.
'Hear, and I will speak;
I will question you, and you declare to me.'
I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear,
but now my eye sees you;
therefore I despise myself,
and repent in dust and ashes." {Holy Bible, Job
42:2-6)
Building upon previous scholarship. Miles
translates Job's reply in a way that is more
consistent with Job's lines of argumentation,
which congeal around justice. In this trans-
lation. Job answers God's power-motif as fol-
lows:
You know you can do anything.
Nothing can stop you. .. .
'You listen, and I'll talk,' you say,
'I'll question you, and you tell me.'
Word of you had reached my ears,
but now that my eyes have seen you,
I shudder with sorrow for mortal clay. (Miles 325)
Miles believes that this translation is stronger
philologically. It is also reflects Job's founda-
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tional claim that, while God may kill him, he
will continue to argue his case. Job does not
yield his claim for justice to God's power
and, in critique of God's monologic deploy-
ment of argument, displays God's failure to
engage in genuine argument, I agree with
Miles's judgment: "Morally, Job has held out
to the very end ,, , when the Lord praises
Job at the end of the book, he is praising
both Job's earlier stubbornness with his hu-
man interlocutors and his final, utterly con-
sistent, stiff-necked recalcitrance before the
Lord himself (325), The implications of this
final exchange are important,
'Job has won," Miles concludes: "The
Lord has lost" (325), God recognizes that Job
was just and in the end restores Job's health
and family, giving him twice what he had at
the beginning of the story. With this defeat,
God falls silent; this is God's last argument in
the Hebrew Bible, This loss, though, is par-
adoxical, as "Job may, therefore, have saved
the Lord from himself (Miles 327) by insist-
ing on the pairing of justice and power,
God's silence after Job has profound theo-
logical implications. God's nature is revealed
as contested, leaving in the wake of this si-
lence "a realistic vision of the world in which
justice is both guaranteed by the good God
and occasionally threatened by the bad
God" (Miles 327), By besting God in argu-
ment. Job demonstrates that humans can re-
main true to justice in the face of power.
With the gifts of the Torah, argument, and
the aspiration of Tsedek, humans from this
point had no direct need to argue with God;
God could be absent, although present in the
face of the Other, and interpretation of the
Hebrew Bible could proceed via the argu-
mentation captured in the Talmud, the text
that provides an unending dialogue about
the meaning of the Torah,
TALMUDIC ARGUMENTATION
Emmanuel Levinas would write in the
twentieth century: "[To love the Torah more
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than God is] protection against the madness
of a direct contact with the Sacred that is
unmediated by reason" [Difficult 144), Re-
sponding to the Holocaust, he drew from the
resources of Judaism to emphasize ethics
over ontology. Contact with God, Levinas
believed, cultivated a divine madness. He
shifted the divine to the Torah and the face
of the Other, Similarly, the Rabbis saw no
need for God's direct presence since God
had given them the law (Torah) at Mt, Sinai.
Reason would serve as the mediator be-
tween and among people, although Levinas,
in contrast to the Rabbis, was quite critical of
rhetoric. The nature and form of reason used
in the Talmud and by the Rabbis was argu-
mentation,
Talmudic reason expressed through argu-
mentation did not turn directly to God, was
rooted in experience and lived time, as-
sumed a set of constant but mutable tradi-
tions, placed the beliefs of those who argued
at risk, allowed freedom of dissent, empha-
sized ad hominem reasoning, sought reasons
for action, and did not seek an end to argu-
ment. The development of this sense of rea-
son was due, in part, to the circumstances of
Jewish life in the Diaspora, With no state or
central power demanding obedience in the
Jewish community, persuasion and argu-
ment were the primary modes of delibera-
tion. Two well-known Talmudic stories
ground its system of reason: the Oven of
Akhnai, "the most frequendy cited talmudic
passage in modem literature," justified com-
munitarian rule over that of God; and the
dispute between the two major rabbinical
schools, Hillel and Shammai, produced the
"these and these" principle (Stone 855), I
have discussed these stories as critical intel-
lectual influences on Chaim Perelman's sys-
tem of argumentation (Frank, "New Rheto-
ric"; Frank, "Dialectical Rapprochement"),
For present purposes I consider them from a
different angle, namely, how the arguing-
with-God tradition establishes the conditions
necessary for decision making in the Tal-
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mud, which leads to the placement of ethics
before ontology and genuine argument be-
fore coercion in normative Jewish thought.
I begin with the end of the Oven of Akh-
nai parable. Elijah reported to the Rabbis
that "[God] laughed [with joy] . . . saying,
'My sons have defeated Me, My sons have
defeated Me' " in argument with the Rabbis
{Babylonian Talmud; Seder Nizikin 353). The
argument lost concerns God's jurisdiction in
a dispute among the Rabbis regarding the
purity of the Oven of Akhnai. One Rabbi
holds that it is pure, but the majority dis-
agrees. This Rabbi offers four proofs that he
is right: three physical signs from heaven (a
tree is uprooted, the flow of a stream re-
versed, and the walls of the school crumble);
and an announcement from a Divine Voice
(a Bot Kol) that the Rabbi is right. The Rab-
bis in the majority base their response on
Deutoronomy 30:12 and Exodus 23:2,
claiming that the "Torah had already been
given at Mt. Sinai; we pay no attention to a
Heavenly Voice because [God has already
written] in the Torah at Mt. Sinai, [follow the
majority]" [Babylonian Talmud; Seder Nizikin
353). It is here that God admits defeat, doing
so presumably because the majority has de-
ployed sacred texts to justify the use of rea-
son rather than divine contact to adjudicate
disagreement.
The use of an argumentum ad Deus to re-
draw the lines of God's jurisdiction is both
ironic and paradoxical, a result that seems to
have given God some pleasure. The impli-
cations for subsequent patterns of thinking
and argument in the Jewish tradition are
important, and I am aware of no similar
stories in the classical or Ghristian traditions.
The Oven of Akhnai parable speaks to ques-
tions of authority, proof, and the role of
human community in judgment. God, and
God's mediators, are not authoritative in dis-
putes. Although God accepts the texts cited
in the majority justification as germane, I
believe the deeper reason why the majority
rejects the divine voice as proof is the one
expressed by Levinas: direct contact with the
Sacred without the mediation of reason pro-
duces madness. Levinas, in particular, finds
Moses's acquiescence to God's command to
kill his son troubling, but finds relief in
Moses's ability to hear and follow the subse-
quent command to desist (G. Katz). In acqui-
escing to God's initial command, Moses was
displaying a kind of divine madness, which
is a result of his contact with God. The rel-
evance for this kind of divine madness in our
period is direct.
The story of the Oven of Akhnai excludes
the Divine from the realm of argument and
seems to replace it with the majority. Yet, the
majority's power in disputes is circum-
scribed as well. The story of the debate be-
tween the two major rabbinical schools, Hil-
lel and Shammai, addresses the status of the
majority and minority, as well as the nature
of truth in Talmudic argumentation.
I begin, again, at the end: two key rabbin-
ical schools have debated an issued for three
years. Heaven is asked to judge, and a divine
voice declares: "both ['these and these'] are
the words of the living God" {Babylonian Tal-
mud; Seder Mo'ed 85-86). Both schools are
said to present truth, even though they may
contradict or display antinomies. Both were
reasonable. But, although their arguments
were sharper, Shammai did not honor Hil-
lel's arguments. As a result, Hillel came
eventually to be preferred in the tradition
because they were in the majority and
treated Shammai's arguments with respect.
An implication of this story is that minor-
ity opinion and dissent are highly valued in
Talmudic argumentation. Shammai may
continue to make arguments, and their argu-
ments are included in those that earn the
consent of the majority. To secure commu-
nal stability, majority rule is a necessary but
certainly not a sufficient guarantee. The
"these and these" principle demonstrates
that those who disagree can command
shards of truth and that the process of argu-
mentation, because it has no ending point.
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must continue. Eor argument to continue,
the very structure of reasoning must be con-
trarian, that is, reflect the multiple truths that
sometimes clash.
These two stories reveal the crossover of
the arguing-with-God tradition into the
sphere of secular human argument. If God's
argument with Job is God's last in the He-
brew Bible, the majority in the Oven of Akh-
nai ensures that reason and argument in
community, rather than with God or God's
mediators, will be the primary means of
dealing with disagreement. And majority
opinion is not simply a replacement for the
divine, although it remains a necessary deci-
sion rule. The "these and these" principle,
derived from the clash between the two rab-
binical schools, reveals the possibility in Tal-
mudic thought that antinomies can coexist.
An even deeper insight to be gained from
this parable and a reading of argumentation
in the Talmud is that, in the words of David
Kraemer in the Mind of the Talmud, "truth is
indeterminable and that altemative views
can encompass different aspects of the whole
truth" (139; see also Neusner). With the in-
sights of these two Talmudic parables in
mind, we now can consider the trajectories
of Talmudic argument and the nature of its
rationality before concluding with a consid-
eration of the Jewish-influenced contribu-
tions of Levinas and Perelman to twenty-
first-century argument theory and practice.
In both the Hebrew Bible and the Tal-
mud, God admits defeat in argument with
humans. The arguing-with-God tradition
ends with God's defeat in Job; God is not
given direct authority in the Talmud, accord-
ing to the Oven of Akhnai story. Argument
between humans in the Talmud, absent the
direct presence of the divine, and capable of
hosting antinomies, does not have an ending
point. "[E]inal answers," writes Kraemer,
"may be unavailable" and as a result,
the process by which answers are sought assumes far
greater interest and acts of study and interpretation
become, on their own terms, expressions of piety.
FALL 2004
Furthermore, in recognition of the elusiveness of a
single, definitive truth, practice is effectively divorced
from truth, and coercion, which may be justified in
the presence of truth, yields to considered persua-
sion. (139)
The "considered persuasion" in the Talmud
was valued independently of its outcomes:
"argumentation has a value independent of a
given conclusion. In fact, argumentation that
led to no conclusion at all was often com-
posed" (Kraemer 90). At this point we can
pause again to juxtapose this version of ar-
gument with that practiced in the Greco-
Roman tradition.
Having conducted close readings of the
classical canon, Hannah Arendt and Ghaim
Perelman both detected a clear desire in the
classical tradition to find a unitary Truth,
which could "reveal itself only in complete
human stillness" (Arendt, Human 15). In-
deed, disagreement indicated error: Des-
cartes's famous codification declared that if
two men disagree, one must be wrong. Ar-
gumentation in this tradition was ruled by
apodictic logic and the syllogism, producing
a conclusion that would end disagreement.
Auerbach argues that Greek reasoning is
characterized by hypotactic logic (in which
the elements of an argument are subordi-
nated under a major or controlling premise)
while Hebraic reasoning is characterized by
paratactic rationality (in which the elements
of an argument are juxtaposed rather than
subordinated). Glassical argument has a de-
finitive end, a conclusion that captures the
truth through apodictic reasoning, designed
to end disagreement and speech. Jewish wis-
dom, claims Arthur Waskow,
has always proceeded in a spiral where the future and
the past are intertwined . . .Jewish wisdom is neither
the endless circle of tradition nor the abrupt progres-
sion of a straight line forward. Always it does mi-
drashr-takes an ancient tradition, gives it a twirl, and
comes out somewhere new. (42)
The Talmud is structured as a spiral, with the
earliest arguments in the middle of the page.
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attended by responses curling around the
center in chronological order. Disagreement
is privileged and assumed, and speech is
valued most highly.
To end disagreement, classical thought
has obeyed the three laws of rationality es-
tablished by Aristotle and many modem
teachers of logic: the laws of identity, non-
contradiction, and the excluded middle, Tal-
mudic logic dissents from these laws, at least
when they move beyond the realm of ab-
stract symbol systems, geometry, and math-
ematics. In the classical tradition, the law of
identity demands that an entity possess an
immutable essence beyond the reach of time
and speech. In thejewish tradition, identity
may be constant but mutable, God and hu-
mans have temperaments, but they change
in time, often because of argument. Take, for
example, the use of proper names in the
Hebrew Bible, A number of names describe
God, and the names of the patriarchs often
change as they mature. As I have discussed,
the law of noncontradiction is transgressed
often in the Talmud; antinomies are not
merely tolerated but comprise the pluralistic
nature of the Jewish universe. True contra-
dictions, which may exist at a certain mo-
ment, may be worked out over time: it may
not be necessary to exclude one of the con-
traries. In the clash between Hillel and
Shammai, Hillel carries the day because it
integrates the contrary opinion of its oppo-
nent into its argument. In Jewish logic, it
does not follow that if two people disagree,
only one must be right. Finally, in the clas-
sical tradition, the law of the excluded mid-
dle holds that a statement is either true or
false; it cannot be both, Talmudic logic seeks
out and cultivates an "included middle," one
that attempts to find or invent common
ground between contraries, Hannah
Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism describes
the consequences of the application of this
form of logic, particularly in the European
answer to the Jewish question. The Nazi
claim was that Furope is not Jewish, a state-
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ment that was either true or false. Of course,
the truth was and is that one could have a
"dual loyalty" and be European and Jewish.
This truth underscores Miles's conclusion
that "Western civilization is descended
equally from Athens and Jerusalem" (408)
and their responses to the tragic.
To summarize, the arguing-with-God tra-
dition and the argumentation in the Talmud
offer a striking contrast to the vision of rea-
son and argument in the classical tradition.
In the final section, I conclude by briefly
positioning Levinas and Perelman as Jewish-
inflected touchstones designed to work
through the tragedies of the last century.
Both reflect the assumptions about speech
and argument that I have identified in the
Hebrew Bible and the Talmud, and give us
philosophical and practical insight into the
construction of twenty-first-century systems
of argumentation.
LEVINAS AND PEKELMAN: THE
JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO
GENUINE ARGUMENTATION
Susan Handelman pairs Levinas and
Perelman as Jewish thinkers, and observes:
"Perelman's great masterwork. The New
Rhetoric (1958), was written, like much of
Levinas's philosophy, in response to the ca-
tastrophes and violence of World War IL"
She further observes that "Perelman's 'new
rhetoric' is close in spirit and has many par-
allels to Levinas's philosophy , , ," [Fragments
237), The major differences between the two
thinkers lie in their views on rhetoric and
religion, Levinas conflates rhetoric with co-
ercion and does not clearly address the pos-
sibility of disagreement between or among
"Others" [Totality and Infinity). Perelman ap-
propriates the secular contributions of Jew-
ish thought to justify rhetoric's rescue, but
does not address religious or theological is-
sues. Pairing Levinas and Perelman gener-
ates a means of working through the traumas
of the twentieth century and the touchstones
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for systems of genuine argumentation in this
century.
Ronald C. Amett's excellent recent over-
view of Levinas's relevance to the study of
argumentation suggests: "It could be argued
that [Levinas] is the most important figure
for understanding ethics between persons in
a postmodern age" (49). In the wake of the
demise of the modem/western conception of
life, which enthroned the autonomous self
and Being, Levinas offers a "philosophical
starting place" in the key notions of the
Other and ethics (49). Amett sees Levinas as
a "corrective" to modem thought and an
"altemative to commonplace communica-
tive assumptions" (49). Rather than begin-
ning with self, Levinas shifts our focus to the
face of the Other, which becomes for him
the face of God. We are responsible for and
to this face, which is sacred.
In contrast to classical philosophies that
sought authenticity through Being, Levinas
calls us to be responsible for others. This
sense of responsibility corrects and reverses
the hierarchy of Western philosophy, plac-
ing the ethical response to the Other before
the pursuit of Being, or ontology. For my
purposes it is important to recall that Levinas
is very much a Jewish thinker, and his think-
ing is directly informed by his encounters
with the Hebrew Bible and Talmud. His
reflections on the story of Moses and Isaac, I
believe, are crucial in that they detect the
danger of direct contact with the divine and
call for the mediation of reason. Levinas,
however, does not dwell on practical reason
or discuss disagreement among Others, nor
does he respect rhetoric.
Handelman judges Levinas's "traditional
bias of the philosopher against the rhetori-
cian [as] unfortunate and mistaken" because
his "conception of the essential sociality of
language as truth is inherently rhetorical"
[Fragments 221). Fortunately, Perelman cor-
rects this bias; the new rhetoric develops
argumentation as an expression of reason
that complements apodictic logic. Perel-
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man's new rhetoric is adapted to its audience
of non-Jewish European philosophers and
employs ad hominem arguments by citing Ar-
istotle's Rhetoric. As I have argued elsewhere,
Perelman's project is subdy critical of the
classical tradition and of Aristotle's treat-
ment of rhetoric (Frank, "Jewish Counter-
model"). His project offers a new, expanded
vision of reason that goes far beyond the
limited conception in Enlightenment
thought. Perelman's vision of reason turned
to Jewish thought as a countermodel. He
believed that a more expansive vision of
reason
ought to be completed by a theory of argumentation
that draws from the dialectical reasoning and rhetoric
from Greco-roman antiquity, but also with Talmudic
methods of reasoning. It is to the study of this theory,
and its extensions in all domains that I have dedi-
cated, for more than twenty years, the majority of my
works. ("My Intellectual" 4)
Although many historians of rhetoric inter-
pret his system as neo-Aristotelian, I believe
it oudines a Jewish rhetoric that reflects a
system of Talmudic principles and practices
of argumentation. At the same time, Perel-
man's new rhetoric almost certainly remains
indebted to classical thought. This suggests
that his work may bridge the two traditions.
The New Rhetoric flows from normative
Jewish habits of thought and Talmudic as-
sumptions about reason and argumentation.
First, it develops the touchstones and stan-
dards of genuine argument present in the
Jewish tradition. Second, its focus on the
audience rather than the speaker is consis-
tent with the Levinasian emphasis on the
Other. Levinas's explanation is deeper and
theologically sounder than Perelman's, but
Perelman better develops the argumentative
resources necessary to respect the Other.
Third, Perelman revises the three laws of
thought in a manner consistent with Jewish
logic. His logic specifically permits the co-
existence of antinomies, and offers dissocia-
tion as a means of dealing with incompati-
bilities (on the use of dissociation in
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argument theory, see Schiappa, "Dissocia-
tion"; Schiappa, Defining.
In his new book. The Rhetoric of Rhetoric,
Wayne C. Booth concurs with Crosswhite
and Vickers that Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca's The New Rhetoric was a "major rev-
olution," represents the "most complex ef-
fort to explore all rhetorical resources for
combating the 'absolutist,' 'Cartesian' view
of truth," and "launches an amazingly deep,
rich, all-inclusive exploration of rhetorical
resources, both from classical giants, espe-
cially Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and
from Renaissance anti-Cartesians on to
1969" (73). "Perelman," Booth concludes, "is
by now sadly neglected" (73). This is sad
because Perelman attempts a rapproche-
ment between classical and Jewish thought.
The Jewish tradition offers much to the
broader study of argumentation. Indeed, the
process of argumentation is often more im-
portant than Truth. Ultimately, the Jewish
tradition of argument teaches the global
community of the benefits of reasoned dis-
course and pluralism. We now know that
ethical behavior is much more likely when
argumentation and persuasion are taught as
mecins of dealing with difference and dis-
agreement. In the Jewish tradition, consen-
sus and dissent coexist, the laws of reason are
sufficiently flexible to accommodate both
constancy and change, and unending argu-
ment results.
Argumentation lies at the spiritual and
metaphysical core of Jewish thought. In this
tradition, God argues with humans. In turn,
humans argue with each other, authority re-
sides in the strength of reasons that acknowl-
edge experience and the Other, and dis-
agreement and contrarian thinking are
prized. Perelman and Levinas maintained a
dual loyalty, one to the classical tradition,
the other to the Jewish heritage. They saw
the commitment of both traditions to reason.
Argumentation scholars can do so as well,
juxtaposing traditions in search of insight
that can help us cultivate the kinds of cour-
age and audacity it took to argue with God,
the sense of responsibility that places ethics
before ontology, and a vision of reason ca-
pable of hosting antinomies.
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